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I.  INTRODUCTION 
From 2015 to 2035, “[b]etween 18,000 and 29,000 miles [. . .] of new 
natural gas” pipelines are projected to be built across the United States.1  Nearly 
a century after the passage of the Natural Gas Act (NGA),2 companies continue 
to expand the massive network of natural gas pipelines throughout the country.3  
The continued expansion benefits companies but is problematic for property 
owners with land in the path of a new pipeline who must make way for the new 
lines.  These owners must contend not only with construction,4 nearly permanent 
loss of property,5 and the dangers of natural gas close to their home,6 but they also 
must deal with uncertainty in compensation.7 
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 1.   ICF Int’l, North American Midstream Infrastructure Through 2035: Leaning  
into the Headwinds, INGAA FOUNDATION, INC. 10 (Apr. 12, 2016) https://www.ingaa. 
org/File.aspx?id=27961&v=db4fb0ca [https://perma.cc/85NE-AQCH]. 
 2.   15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h). 
 3.   ICF Int’l, supra note 1, at 7. 
 4.   FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, An Interstate Natural Gas Facility on My Land? What Do I 
Need to Know? 11–13 (2015), https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=4074 [https://perma.cc/B5FH-
3Z56].  
 5.   See, e.g., S. STAR CENT. GAS PIPELINE, Land Use Development and Right-of-Way 
Handbook 15–16 (Dec. 2019) (stating that not even “deep-rooted shrubs” may be maintained on the 
land used for the pipeline), https://www.southernstar.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
dlm_uploads/2019/03/75-Land-Use-Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL63-KA43]; FED. ENERGY 
REG. COMM’N, supra note 4, at 10 (stating the right-of-way may last twenty years, fifty years, or 
longer).  
 6.   See, e.g., S. STAR CENT. GAS PIPELINE, Important Safety Message for your Community 2–3 
(2018), https://www.southernstar.com/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2019/03/2018-Affected-
Public-Brochure-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/YSE8-V2EJ]. 
 7.   See RJ Vogt, Land Grab: Property Owners Fight Back Against Pipeline IOUs, LAW360 
(April 28, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1153244/land-grab-property-owners-fight-back-
against-pipeline-ious [https://perma.cc/R8UW-DU66]. 
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Under the NGA, Congress delegates eminent domain authority to private 
pipeline companies for construction of new lines once they meet certain criteria.8  
Oftentimes, the companies that make it as far as filing eminent domain 
proceedings will seek to accelerate the process by filing for preliminary 
injunctions that grant the company immediate access to the land that is to be 
condemned.9  This occurs prior to termination of the condemnation proceeding 
and prior to payment of the just compensation required of all eminent domain 
actions. 
Whether a company may enter the land before it pays depends on the 
rights the company has in the target land.  The Seventh Circuit required a company 
to display a substantial substantive right to possess the land.10  Other circuits have 
allowed pipelines to “take-first” and “pay-later,”11 after a relatively easier 
showing of a substantive right to possess the land.12  This split in authority over 
substantive rights to the target land has created the issue at hand.  Four circuits 
have yet to decide the issue, including the Fifth Circuit13 and Tenth Circuit14, 
which rank first and second in total mileage of transmission pipeline. 
The Tenth Circuit should decide the issue of whether a natural gas 
company must pay a landowner before or after the company enters and takes the 
property.  While many courts have argued that no split exists, this Comment 
argues the Tenth Circuit must recognize the varying standards set forth in the 
Seventh Circuit’s Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land15 and the 
Fourth Circuit’s East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage16  before it ultimately 
sides with the majority Sage method.  Applying this new rule to a recent District 
of Kansas case would lead the Tenth Circuit to resolve the circuit split for itself 
 
 8.   15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h) (describing the “take first, pay later” model of land acquisition by 
private companies and how most landowners approached by these companies do not get attorneys to 
represent them, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation). 
 9.   See, e.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 210 (4th Cir.) cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1141–44 
(11th Cir. 2018) cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1634 (2019); N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 
144 F.3d 469, 470 (7th Cir. 1998); E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 820 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 10.   N. Border Pipeline Co., 144 F.3d at 471. 
 11.   Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 915 F.3d at 213–14.  
 12.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725, 734–
35 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019); Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 915 F.3d at 
214; Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, 757 F. App’x 489, 491 (6th Cir. 2018); All. 
Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 2014); Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 
17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 776–77 (9th Cir. 2008); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 
F.3d at 1147–48. 
 13.   The Fifth Circuit has roughly 87,282 miles of natural gas transmission pipeline.  See U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Estimated Natural Gas Pipeline Mileage in the Lower 48 States, Close of 2008 
(2008), https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/archive/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/mileage.html 
[https://perma.cc/BLM4-8THM].  
 14.   The Tenth Circuit has roughly 59,561 miles of natural gas transmission pipeline.  See id.  
 15.   144 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 16.   361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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in favor of allowing entry prior to just compensation if the case were brought 
before it. 
Section II of this Comment will lay out critical background information 
that make this situation possible.  Section III analyzes the various approaches, 
arguing the Tenth Circuit should adopt and apply the approach taken by the Sage 
court.  Finally, Section IV concludes the Comment with final thoughts and long-
term solutions.  The Tenth Circuit must recognize the split of authority, but 
ultimately it should follow the Sage approach for finding substantive rights 
requisite for granting immediate entry before payment of just compensation. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
A company opting to use eminent domain to acquire a right-of-way for 
a new natural gas pipeline will have a difficult, though well-traveled road ahead 
of it.  Eminent domain under the NGA first requires approval from the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).17  Once it has a FERC order, the 
company must attempt to buy the required property before it can begin eminent 
domain action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 71.1.18  A company 
may sue for a finding that they have a substantive right to the land at that moment, 
rather than at the end of normal eminent domain actions.19  Deciding what is 
required to have a substantive right is the center of the argument in this Comment.  
If a company is found to have a substantive right, the court will look to caselaw 
and to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to determine if the company merits a 
preliminary injunction for the property.20  If the company does merit such an 
injunction, it may immediately begin construction, enabling the company to draw 
a profit after the long and arduous battle needed to get to that point. 
 
A. Statutory Basis 
Eminent domain power comes from the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  To qualify for eminent domain power, the Takings Clause requires 
land takings be for the public benefit and the former landowners be justly 
compensated.21  The Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA)22 extended this power to 
 
 17.   15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(c). 
 18.   Id. § 717f(h). 
 19.   Id.  
 20.   See, e.g., E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co., 361 F.3d at 828 (considering four factors: irreparable harm 
to plaintiff if the injunction is denied, irreparable harm to defendant if granted, likelihood plaintiff will 
succeed on the merits, and public policy). 
 21.   U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 22.   15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h).  See also Valerie L. Chartier-Hogancamp, Fairness and Justice: 
Discrepancies in Eminent Domain for Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines, 49 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 67, 71–75 
(2019) (providing a history of the Natural Gas Act and the reason for its passage). 
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private companies who were building natural gas pipelines but the NGA left some 
details such as timing of compensation unclear.23  A few years earlier, the 
Declaration of Taking Act (DTA) was passed to facilitate New Deal government 
projects.24  The DTA explicitly grants the government the quick-take authority, 
or the ability  to immediately take possession and title to property it needs, while 
leaving compensation to be settled later.25 
By comparison—for the NGA to be utilized—the private companies 
must hold a FERC certificate and must have made an offer over $3,000 for each 
parcel of land, suggesting that eminent domain be a last resort after negotiations 
have failed.26  This sets an outer limit on timing but leaves a large window of time 
open and available.27  The NGA lays this process out saying: 
 
When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity 
cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of 
property to the compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way 
to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the 
transportation of natural gas, . . . it may acquire the same by the exercise 
of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States 
for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State 
courts.28 
These “proceeding[s] . . . shall conform as nearly as may be with [Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 71.1] . . . .”29  In relevant part, Rule 71.1 requires the condemnor 
to make any required deposits with the court and following this “deposit, the court 
and attorneys must expedite the proceedings so as to distribute the deposit and to 
determine and pay compensation.”30  Rule 71.1 also provides guidance on the 
issue of timing and land possession, as it permits dismissal of an action by the 
movant only “[i]f no compensation hearing[s] . . . ha[ve] begun [and the movant] 
has not acquired title or a lesser interest or taken possession. . . .”31 
 
 23.   See 15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h). 
 24.   Jim Behnke & Harold Dondis, The Sage Approach to Immediate Entry by Private Entities 
Exercising Federal Eminent Domain Authority Under the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power 
Act, 27 ENERGY L.J. 499, 523–24 (2006) (discussing 40 U.S.C. § 3114(b) (2000)). 
 25.   Id. 
 26.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725, 731 (3d 
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019). 
 27.   15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h). 
 28.   Id.  
 29.   Notwithstanding this section of the NGA, courts are now to follow Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 71.1, instead of the “practice and procedure” of the state where the action is taking place.  
Id.  See also All. Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 F.3d 362, 366–67 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 30.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1(j). 
 31.   FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1. 
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Rule 71.1 provides limited guidance on the issue of timing and land 
possession.32  By requiring a deposit by the company payable to the landowner 
and by considering the start of compensation hearings and acquisition of an 
interest in the property as separate factors, an outline for timing is provided.33  But 
these requirements still only provide procedure for the takings.  Due to Rule 71.1’s 
limited nature, “the regular rules of civil procedure apply when Rule [71.1] is 
silent.”34  Critically, FRCP 65 grants authority for preliminary injunctions.  Rule 
65 is designed to allow court action “when necessary to prevent irreparable harm 
pending a final determination of the parties’ claims.”35  Use of Rule 65(c), like 
71.1, requires a deposit to the court, but this one is provided to assuage injury for 




FERC heads the “[r]egulation of pipeline, storage, and liquefied natural 
gas facility construction” and  “[r]egulation of facility abandonment.”37  Every 
company using the NGA must first obtain a FERC Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity (certificate).38  Attaining a certificate is an extensive 
process, in some cases taking over a year.39  FERC sends out various letters and 
notices to “interested parties” regarding the environmental impact, pipeline 
routes, and other potential issues.40  FERC also “invite[s] comment” at points 
throughout the process in an attempt to identify all impacts and impacted parties 
 
 32.   See id. 
 33.   Id. 
 34.   E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 823 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 35.   N. Nat. Gas Co. v. 9117 Acres, No. CIV.A. 10-1232-DWB, 2013 WL 3328773, at *14 (D. 
Kan. July 2, 2013); FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
 36.   FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c).  
 37.   Natural Gas, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.ferc.gov 
/industries-data/natural-gas [https://perma.cc/M5K3-MGXJ]. 
 38.   15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h).  See also Rebecca Ewing, Pipeline Companies Target Small Farmers 
and Use Eminent Domain for Private Gain, 38 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 125, 138–39 (2016) (providing an 
alternative description of the FERC process). 
 39.   See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 
725, 729 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 
Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1143 (11th Cir. 2018) cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1634 (2019); Nexus Gas 
Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, 757 F. App’x 489, 491 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 40.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d at 729 
(sending to “all levels of government, interest groups, Native American tribes, affected property 
owners, local media and libraries, and other interested parties.”). 
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before it issues a certificate.41  FERC will also notify landowners of their ability 
to “intervene in [the] proceedings” after the company has filed.42 
After FERC collects all the data it needs and reviews it, FERC will 
choose to issue or withhold the certificate.  In the case of Transcontinental Gas 
Pipe Line Company in the Third Circuit, FERC found the project suitable “based 
on the benefits of the pipeline, the minimal adverse effects on landowners or 
surrounding communities, and the absence of adverse effects on existing 
customers and other pipelines and their captive customers.”43  Transcontinental’s 
certificate, like others, was conditioned on certain things such as a mandatory in-
service date.44 
Appealing a granted FERC certificate is also a significant process.  An 
application for rehearing must be submitted directly to FERC “within thirty days 
after the issuance of” a certificate.45  Appeals from this rehearing must be made 
to the appeals court in which the property sits within sixty days.46  Many 
landowners attempt to delay construction by attacking the FERC order directly in 
district court, which is always a losing argument when the attack occurs outside 
of the statutory appeals process.47 
 
C. Substantive Right 
A substantive right is “any interest that a person has in doing or 
refraining from any conduct; in having a given status or achieving it; or in having, 
receiving, or granting a thing, which is protected by law. . . .”48  “Substantive 
rights are to be distinguished from procedural or remedial rights that prescribe 
methods of obtaining redress or enforcement of substantive rights.”49  Resolving 
the timing issue of payment involves resolving what substantive right a natural 
gas company has at a given time.  All courts agree that a substantive right to the 
 
 41.   Id. at 729–30.  During this process FERC can receive a high response volume.  For example, 
“[a]t four public meetings in June 2016, FERC heard from 203 speakers and received over 560 written 
comments and 900 identical letters on the draft [Environmental Impact Statement].”  Id. at 730. 
 42.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d at 1143.  
 43.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d at 730 
(internal citation omitted). 
 44.   Id.  Some courts have questioned the importance of this date, especially when the in-service 
date is used as an argument for a preliminary injunction.  Compare Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 
Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 772 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (suggesting the deadline is less important), with Mountain 
Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 211, 222 (4th Cir. 2019) cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
300 (2019) (suggesting an elevated power for these deadline dates).  
 45.   15 U.S.C.S. § 717r(a).  
 46.   Id. § 717r(b). 
 47.   Id. § 717r(a); see Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 
F.3d at 740. 
 48.   Substantive Right, BOUVIER L. DICTIONARY (accessed through Lexis Nexis). 
 49.   Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 795 P.2d 1006, 1011 (N.M. 1990). 
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land is required prior to immediate possession of property and to any eminent 
domain seizure at all.50  What courts do not agree on, is what that substantive right 
looks like. 
Many courts declare that a substantive right to begin eminent domain 
actions requires only conformity with the NGA: “(1) it held a valid [FERC 
certificate]; (2) the property to be condemned was necessary for the . . . [p]roject; 
and (3) it could not acquire the necessary easements by contract.”51  The Eleventh 
Circuit found that these requirements were enough for a partial summary 
judgment, and thus a substantive right as required for preliminary injunction.52  
The Third Circuit changed things slightly for the second two requirements.53  The 
Third Circuit requires “that the gas company negotiate with the landowner for the 
necessary right of way and that [the] value of the right of way exceeds $3000.”54  
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits also considered partial summary judgment as 
establishing the substantive right needed for preliminary injunction, though they 
did so with little debate.55 
The Ninth Circuit is the outlier, though its differences were slight.  
Initially denying that the company had substantive right to condemn,56 the court 
said that it could gain this right by obtaining an “order of condemnation” from the 
district court.57  This had the same three requirements as in the Third and Eleventh 
Circuit decisions, but the Ninth was more overt about a good faith requirement in 
the negotiations.58  The Ninth Circuit also followed the Fourth Circuit’s E. Tenn. 
Natural Gas Co. v. Sage opinion in requiring a condemnation order “before the 
substantive right of taking accrues,” because such an order “strikes the correct 




 50.   See, e.g., Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d at 736 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(describing the right as “crucial”); Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, 757 F. App’x 489, 
492 n.2 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 51.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1148 (11th Cir. 2018) cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1634 (2019).  See also Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 
211 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019). 
 52.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d at 1153–54 (citing 15 U.S.C.S. § 
717f(h)). 
 53.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d at 731. 
 54.   Id. 
 55.   See infra Section II.E.2.   
 56.   Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 2008).   
 57.   Id. at 776. 
 58.   Id. (quoting Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. 138 Acres of Land, 84 F. Supp. 2d 405, 416 
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal citations omitted)).  
 59.   Id. at 777. 
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D. Preliminary Injunctions 
Once a court has decided that a substantive right exists, the court has the 
ability to consider equitable relief.  Equitable relief is the solution courts look to 
when available remedies at law do not meet the needs of the parties in the given 
circumstances.60  In NGA eminent domain actions, equitable relief is usually 
metered out in the form of preliminary injunctions.61  These injunctions are a grant 
of authority to the company to take immediate possession of the properties that 
they need “while [just compensation] proceedings were ongoing.”62  One court, 
however, argued that specifically this is a “mandatory injunction, which is 
‘particularly disfavored’ in the law” because this motion does not seek to 
“preserve the status quo” which is the reason why preliminary injunctions “are 
primarily issued.”63  “Mandatory preliminary injunctions” have more difficult 
requirements for movants to meet before issuance than typical preliminary 
injunctions.64 
Each circuit uses a variation of roughly the same four-prong test for 
granting preliminary injunctions.65  The Fourth Circuit’s test from the Winter v. 
 
 60.   E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 823 (4th Cir. 2004) (“However, when a 
substantive right exists, an equitable remedy may be fashioned to give effect to that right if the 
prescribed legal remedies are inadequate.”) (citing Berdie v. Kurtz, 88 F.2d 158, 159 (9th Cir. 1937)). 
 61.   Id.  (“The district court followed these principles when it granted ETNG equitable relief in 
the form of a preliminary injunction that allowed the company to take early possession of the 
condemned property.”). 
 62.   See Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 211 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 
140 S. Ct. 300 (2019). 
 63.   Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994)).  If more courts 
followed this approach, it would make preliminary injunctions and thus eminent domain much harder 
on the natural gas companies, potentially altering the analysis and balancing that follows in the 
Comment.  
 64.   Id. (stating mandatory preliminary injunctions are only to be granted if “the fact and law 
clearly favor the moving party.”) (quoting Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 
1994)). 
 65.   See e.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 915 F.3d at 211 (requiring the moving party to 
establish “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 
the public interest.”) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); Transcon. 
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725, 732 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019) (requiring that there first be a “reasonable probability of success on the 
merits, 2) that there will be irreparable harm to the movant in the absence of relief, 3) that granting the 
injunction will not result in greater harm to the nonmoving party, and 4) that the public interest favors 
granting the injunction”) (citing Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017)); 
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1163 (11th Cir. 2018) cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 1634 (2019) (demanding proof that the party seeking the preliminary injunction first demonstrate 
“substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the 
injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed 
injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the 
public interest”) (quoting Am.’s Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, 742 F.3d 1319, 1329 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Supreme Court case66 first asks if the 
movant “is likely to succeed on the merits.”67  When the company has already 
been “granted partial summary judgement . . . on its claim that it is entitled to 
exercise the power of eminent domain,” this determination is easy.68  The second 
prong considers whether the movant is “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of preliminary relief.”69  There must be a “clear showing” of harm that is 
not “remote [or] speculative, but actual and imminent.”70  The harm must be 
“irreparable [and thus] ‘cannot be fully rectified by the final judgement after 
trial.’”71  This may include “substantial [unrecoverable] economic losses” to the 
company in various forms.72  Third is whether losses to the movant company 
“would exceed any harms [the] injunction might cause the Landowners.”73  
Finally, the test asks if “an injunction is in the public interest.”74  The courts give 
extra weight to the first two factors during their consideration75 but use the factors 
to “simply guide the discretion of the court.”76 
 
E. The Split 
The Seventh Circuit’s Northern Border case77 and the Fourth Circuit’s 
Sage case78 provided two subtly different approaches for granting (or denying) 
immediate entry in NGA eminent domain actions.  The Seventh Circuit, in a short 
but crucial opinion, set a high bar for what is required of a would-be-condemnor 
of property to take immediate possession.79  By contrast, the Fourth Circuit 
deviated from the Seventh Circuit when it took a more relaxed approach that 
found substantive rights to possess with much less evidence of right to 
 
 66.   Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 915 F.3d at 211 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).  
 67.   Id. at 211 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).  
 68.   Id. at 216. 
 69.   Id. at 211 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). 
 70.   Id. at 216 (quoting Direx Isr., Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 
1991)). 
 71.   Id. (quoting Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., 695 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 72.   Id. at 212 (citing Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. Simmons, 307 F. Supp. 3d 506 (N.D.W. 
Va. 2018)).   
 73.   Id. 
 74.   Id. at 211 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). 
 75.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725, 732 (3d 
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019). 
 76.   Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, 757 F. App’x 489, 492 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(quoting McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc)). 
 77.   N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 78.   E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 79.   See N. Border Pipeline Co., 144 F.3d at 472. 
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possession.80  Following these cases, six Courts of Appeals have addressed this 
issue and have sided with the Fourth Circuit, each delineating the lower bar for 
substantive right slightly.81 
 
1. The Seventh Circuit’s Higher Bar for Substantive Right to Condemn 
The Seventh Circuit in Northern Border required an “argument grounded 
in substantive law establishing a preexisting entitlement to the property” before 
immediate possession could be granted.82  The Northern Border case had semi-
unique facts that would have forced a denial of substantive rights under any 
standard.83  Nonetheless, the standard the Seventh Circuit established when it 
rejected the request of Northern Border Pipeline Company (NBPC) was a strict 
one.  NBPC wanted land to extend its natural gas pipeline.84  NBPC sought to take 
that land through eminent domain and to take it quickly.85 
The company sought a preliminary injunction for immediate possession 
right after it initiated condemnation proceedings.86  However, the circuit and 
district courts agreed that NBPC had “no legal right to immediate possession 
under either federal substantive law or Illinois substantive law” as was required 
to take the land right then.87  NBPC argued that, notwithstanding the “lack of 
substantive entitlement,” the court could “have exercised its equitable power to” 
grant the preliminary injunction.88  The district court held the preliminary 
injunction was not possible, even if the court’s equitable powers would allow such 
a motion without the legal substantive right.89 
The Northern Border court used the example of two software developers 
who have a falling-out—with one developer attempting to take their product from 
the other—in order to demonstrate the kind of substantive right needed before a 
 
 80.   See E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co., 361 F.3d at 818. 
 81.   See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 
725, 739 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019); Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 
Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 214–15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019); Nexus Gas Transmission, 
757 F. App’x at  492 n.2; Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 777 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1152 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 
S. Ct. 1634 (2019). 
 82.   N. Border Pipeline Co., 144 F.3d at 472. 
 83.   Compare id. at 470 (where the company immediately sought right to possess), and 
Transwestern Pipeline Co., 550 F.3d at 773 (same), with Mountain Valley Pipeline, 915 F.3d at 214  
(where the company waited until later in the proceeding to attempt to claim possession). 
 84.   N. Border Pipeline Co., 144 F.3d at 470. 
 85.   Id.  
 86.   Id.  
 87.   Id. at 471. 
 88.   Id.   
 89.   Id.  
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preliminary injunction can be granted.90  In the example, there is a statute that 
allows for taking of property, but does not explicitly provide for immediate 
possession (similar to the NGA).91  The court held that preliminary injunction to 
seize the property was available to the software developer but not NBPC.92 
The court outlined the crucial differences between the software maker 
seeking immediate possession of the co-developed software and the NGA taker.93  
The court agreed the difference between them was “the party receiving immediate 
possession of the software claimed an ownership interest in the property that, if it 
existed at all, was fully vested even before initiation of the lawsuit.”94  By contrast, 
NBPC had no “preexisting entitlement to the defendants’ land” so the court held 
the company could not use a preliminary injunction.95  The company would be 
eligible for a preliminary injunction if it “present[ed] an argument grounded in 
substantive law establishing a preexisting entitlement to the property.”96 
The Northern Border opinion does not require a preexisting entitlement 
that predates the start of the lawsuit.97  While no right must exist quite as early as 
it did for the software maker, the Northern Border court does require a substantial 
entitlement prior to the granting of equitable relief.98  The substantive entitlement 
described here is akin to the right or entitlement that arises “at the conclusion of 
the normal eminent domain process.”99  The court in Northern Border saw itself 
as granting not only a substantive right, but also a substantial one.100  It opted to 
not give that up very easily.  Among early Americans there was a “fear[] that ‘one 
adjudication would form a precedent to the next, and this to a following one.’”101  
These fears may have not been without reason.  Beginning with the East 
Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage opinion in 2004, circuit courts across the 
country set a new and lower bar for substantive rights, establishing the circuit split 




 90.   Id. at 471–72.   
 91.   Compare id. at 471, with 15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h). 
 92.   N. Border Pipeline Co., 144 F.3d at 471 .   
 93.   Id. at 471–72.   
 94.   Id. at 472.   
 95.   Id.   
 96.   Id.   
 97.   Id. at 471–72. 
 98.   See id. 
 99.   Id. at 471. 
 100.   See id. at 471–72. 
 101.   Jeremy P. Hopkins & Elisabeth M. Hopkins, Separation of Powers: A Forgotten Protection 
in the Context of Eminent Domain and the Natural Gas Act, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 371, 392 (2004) 
(quoting THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 308 
(Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986)).   
 102.   E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 823 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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2. Lowering the Bar on Requirements for Substantive Rights to 
Condemn 
The Sage court approved of the district court’s issuing an order 
determining the right to use eminent domain as successfully giving the company 
“an interest in the landowners’ property that could be protected in equity if the 
conditions for granting equitable (in this case, injunctive) relief were satisfied.”103  
The Sage court found support for this idea in Supreme Court precedent from the 
nineteenth century where “interests in property distinct from the legal ownership 
[. . . .] constitute[d] an equity [interest] which a court of equity will protect and 
enforce.”104  On these grounds, the Sage court decided that it could grant 
immediate entry, and that a property interest that could be protected in equity—
but an interest less than legal ownership—was all that was required before 
considering preliminary injunction.105  The Sage court and the opinions that 
followed established this lower bar for a substantive right and thus created the 
circuit split with the Seventh Circuit. 
The Sage court acknowledged that relief in equity “may not be used to 
create new substantive rights.”106  Thus, any equitable relief it grants must be 
founded upon a preexisting substantive right.107  By granting a preliminary 
injunction the Sage court was stating the company had done enough to establish 
a substantive right.108  This level of requirement is predicated on an analysis not 
made or considered by the Northern Border court.  The Sage court believed 
Congress had not intended the court, nor had it given the court authority, to require 
more than the minimum requirements as laid out in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65.109  This perception left the Sage court with seemingly little choice 
in what to require. 
In the last fifteen years, six circuit courts accepted the approach provided 
by the Fourth Circuit in the Sage opinion.110  The courts mostly allowed natural 
gas companies to immediately enter land and begin construction even though 
 
 103.   Id.   
 104.   Id. (quoting Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. 202, 213–14 (1868)).   
 105.   See id. 
 106.   Id. (citing Norwest Bank of Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206–07 (1988)).   
 107.   Id. at 828. 
 108.   See id. 
 109.   Id. at 824. 
 110.   See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 
725, 739 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019); Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 
Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 214–15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019); Nexus Gas Transmission, 
LLC v. City of Green, 757 F. App’x 489, 492 n.2 (6th Cir. 2018); Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 
Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 777 (9th Cir. 2008); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 
1152 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1634 (2019). 
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payment was not yet finalized.111  These cases all start the same way: the natural 
gas company is given a FERC certificate, the company attempts to negotiate with 
landowners, and then the company files suit against those it could not come to 
terms with in the end.112  In most of the courts, the company immediately filed 
motions for partial summary judgment and for preliminary injunction to take 
possession.113  These opinions followed and often expanded upon the Sage court’s 
reasoning, further explaining the lower bar for finding a substantive right to take. 
Years after it decided Sage, the Fourth Circuit heard Mountain Valley 
Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres.114  Like the Sage court, the court in Mountain Valley 
granted a preliminary injunction after a finding of a “substantive right to 
condemn;” it did so through partial summary judgment, which was not challenged 
on appeal.115  When it granted the motions on the right to take, “the courts 
explained, the holder of a duly issued [FERC] certificate has the right to condemn 
property if it is necessary for pipeline construction and operation and cannot be 
acquired by private agreement.”116  The Mountain Valley court understood the 
importance of just compensation and—prior to considering and granting the 
preliminary injunction—required the company to deposit money into a fund that 
“each Landowner would be entitled to draw on” while the proceeding continued, 
in addition to a surety bond “in an amount double each easement’s estimated 
value” before it granted immediate entry.117  While just compensation payments 
are required before the transfer of title, these deposits made the court more 
comfortable with early entry because the payments assured the owners that money 
would be available to pay their just compensation upon the conclusion of the 
proceedings. 
As in the Mountain Valley case, in the Third Circuit’s Transcontinental 
Gas Pipeline Company, LLC v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, the district 
court first denied motions for “immediate entitlement based [only] on the 
 
 111.   Compare Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d at 
737, and Mountain Valley Pipeline, 915 F.3d at 214, and Nexus Gas Transmission, 757 F. App’x at 
493, and All. Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 F.3d 362, 369 (8th Cir. 2014), and Transcon. 
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d at 1172 (allowing the pipeline company to possess the land, 
shortly after which construction began), with Transwestern Pipeline Co., 550 F.3d at 772 (denying 
right to immediate possession until after a condemnation order was issued. This delay postponed 
construction indefinitely until the condemnation order was issued in a subsequent proceeding). 
 112.  See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d at 729–
31; Mountain Valley Pipeline, 915 F.3d at 209–10; Nexus Gas Transmission, 757 F. App’x at 491. 
 113.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d at 734–35; 
Mountain Valley Pipeline, 915 F.3d at 210; Nexus Gas Transmission, 757 F. App’x at 491; All. 
Pipeline L.P., 746 F.3d at 365; Transwestern Pipeline Co., 550 F.3d at 773; Transcon. Gas Pipe Line 
Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d at 1144. 
 114.   915 F.3d 197 (4th Cir. 2019).  
 115.   Id. at 214.   
 116.   Id. at 211.   
 117.   Id. at 212.   
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existence of the FERC order”118 but “noted that if Transcontinental later 
established its right to condemn, the court would be able to use its equitable power 
to award preliminary injunctive relief.”119  Transcontinental then moved for 
partial summary judgment on their right to condemn which the district court 
granted because there was “no dispute that Transcontinental met the three 
requirements for seeking eminent domain under the NGA.”120  Having granted 
partial summary judgment, the court found a supported substantive right to the 
property sufficient to permit a preliminary injunction.121 
Like the Fourth and Third Circuits above, the Eleventh Circuit similarly 
used partial summary judgments to find a substantive right to take the land needed 
for the pipeline.122  In considering its equitable powers, this court added that their 
equitable powers “should be broadly construed to afford complete relief under a 
statute.”123  The court held that Congress had not indicated a desire to prevent 
such practices in eminent domain through the NGA statute itself, and therefore it 
was permissible.124  The court went on to affirm the trial court’s holding that a 
company had a sufficient right to seek immediate entry if: (1) the company “held 
a valid [FERC certificate]; (2) the property to be condemned was necessary for 
the [project]; and (3) it could not acquire the necessary easements by contract.”125  
Finally, the court held that the company receiving summary judgment in their 
favor on the right to eminent domain was equivalent to receipt of the substantive 
right to seek a preliminary injunction for immediate entry.126 
In the Ninth Circuit, Transwestern Pipeline Co., LLC was denied its 
motion for preliminary injunction127 because a preliminary injunction could not 
“provide the basis for new substantive rights” and such injunctions “are primarily 
issued to preserve the status quo of the parties.”128  As such, the court required 
“the issuance of an order of condemnation by the district court” for there to be a 
“substantive right to condemn the affected parcels.”129  This order only came after 
Transwestern could show it held a relevant FERC certificate, the land desired was 
required for the project, no agreement could be reached between company and 
landowner, and, finally, the Ninth Circuit required Transwestern to establish it 
 
 118.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d at 731.   
 119.   Id.   
 120.   Id. at 731–32.   
 121.   Id. at 741.   
 122.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1144, 1153 (11th Cir. 2018), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1634 (2019).   
 123.   Id. at 1152 (quoting Lewis v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 1992)).   
 124.   Id. at 1153.   
 125.   See id. at 1163 (citing 15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h)).   
 126.   See id.   
 127.   Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 2008).   
 128.   Id. at 776 (emphasis omitted).   
 129.   Id.   
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acted in good faith in negotiations.130  The Transwestern court held that after the 
satisfaction of these requirements and subsequent order of condemnation, the 
company could meet the preliminary injunction standard.131 
 
3. The Argument that There is No Circuit Split 
Jim Behnke and Harold Dondis wrote an article detailing the Sage 
court’s decision where they reject the idea of a circuit split with the Seventh 
Circuit.132  While it used a thorough combination of examples, case analysis, and 
discussion of inherent court powers to accurately describe the Sage court’s 
approach, they fall short of completely rebuffing the argument that the Sage court 
created a circuit split with the Northern Border court.133  These examples do not 
prove as much as the authors seem to suggest.  In fact, these sources help to 
identify the differences in the two standards and the legally significant distinction 
between them.134  The Sage Approach considers a number of examples in 
discerning the requirements of the Seventh Circuit as compared to that of the 
Fourth Circuit.135 
 
F. Landowner Arguments 
The Landowners who are adamant enough about their desire to keep their 
land to fight the eminent domain action in court will have a lot pushing against 
them.136  These Landowners frequently contend that because the NGA does not 
specifically provide for immediate possession, it is impermissible.137  In Nexus 
Gas Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, despite a third party’s amicus brief 
argument that federal courts did not have the right to grant immediate possession 
 
 130.   Id. (quoting Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. 138 Acres of Land, 84 F. Supp. 2d 405, 416 
(W.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
 131.   See id. at 777–78.   
 132.   Behnke & Dondis, supra note 24.   
 133.   See id. at 516.  
 134.   For example, the authors first consider “real property option and purchase and sale 
agreements,” and second, they consider mortgages, specifically in title theory states.  Id. at 516–17.  
As the authors themselves admit to a limited extent, the first and second examples deal with consensual 
exchanges.  Id. at 517.  Third and finally, they look at life estates which, while maybe not necessarily 
an “exchange,” deals with predetermined legal interests.  Id.  While each of these does present the type 
of divided interest that they contend is at the heart of the “non-split,” each example fails to fully match 
the type of split interest present in these cases where the condemnor-to-be holds a partial interest in 
the property, but does not have the right to take the property at that time.  Id. at 516–17.   
 135.   Id. 
 136.   Vogt, supra note 7. 
 137.   15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(h).  The Fourth Circuit in Mountain Valley relied on Sage for the notion 
that, notwithstanding a lack of express provision in the NGA, a court may still grant the immediate 
possession.  Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 213–14 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019).  
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to private parties,138 the Sixth Circuit dismissed the argument and granted Nexus’ 
partial summary judgment.139  Alternatively, these landowners have argued that 
the company and the court were essentially creating a quick-take provision.140  
Quick-take provisions are drastic measures that have been reserved for the federal 
government up to this point.141  One court distinguished quick-take and straight 
condemnations saying that because the company “does not yet have title but will 
receive it once final compensation is determined and paid” and because the 
Landowners could file briefs before the injunction was granted, this was not a 
quick-take.142 
 
G. District of Kansas 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet directly considered the 
issue addressed in this Comment, but over the last few years the District of Kansas 
has looked at the NGA and its eminent domain provisions in the context of natural 
gas wells in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.3 Acres. This case 
has been appealed and remanded several times up and down through the Kansas 
court system.  In this case, the NGA was to be used by the company to “implement 
its containment plan for the Cunningham Storage Field”143 as part of a plan to 
resolve gas migration issues and fortify their “substantially at risk” storage 
field.144  FERC expressed concern at any potential delay, rejecting the company’s 
“initial proposal for a ‘wait and see’ approach.”145 
This case provides a basis for analyzing and suggesting how the Tenth 
Circuit should handle this issue if this case or cases like it ever came before the 
Tenth Circuit.146  The District of Kansas opinion is not binding on the Tenth 
Circuit at large, but it is informative.147  This case considered and ultimately 
 
 138.   See 757 F. App’x 489, 492 n.2 (6th Cir. 2018).   
 139.   Id. at 497.  By the time of the Sixth Circuit case, it had become well established that  
“[u]nless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s 
jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.”  Id. (quoting 
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1392 (2015)).   
 140.   See id. 
 141.   See supra Section II.A (discussing the DTA). 
 142.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725, 735 (3d 
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019). 
 143.   See N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, No. 10-1232-MLB, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34388, at *27 (D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2012). 
 144.   Id. at *40. 
 145.   Id.  
 146.   See generally id. at *59.  
 147.   See Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
140 S. Ct. 300 (2019); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 
725, 741 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019); Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City 
of Green, 757 F. App’x 489, 497 (6th Cir. 2018); All. Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 F.3d 
 
2020] PICKING UP A 7–10 SPLIT 305 
adopted the Sage court’s approach after finding it presented a better standard,148 
but, in application, did not require good faith negotiations.149  The court then 
considered the four elements of a preliminary injunction at elevated scrutiny,150 




This Comment demonstrates in Section III.A that the Fourth Circuit’s 
Sage opinion established an appropriate and useful bar for substantive rights that 
has been carried on by its descendants.  Section III.B considers the appeal and 
benefits of the countervailing arguments for finding substantive rights.  Section 
III.C looks to landowner arguments and traditional societal interests and answers 
the question as to what a centered and fair approach to substantive rights looks 
like.  Finally, Section III.D applies these conclusions to a District of Kansas case 
demonstrating that when the lower bar for a substantive right to eminent domain 
is met, the court has the right to, and must, grant access to property through 
preliminary injunctions prior to payment of just compensation. 
The Seventh Circuit, in its Northern Border opinion, required not only a 
FERC certificate, but critically also established and required a high bar for a “legal 
right to immediate possession under either federal substantive law or Illinois 
substantive law” for immediate possession and found them unsatisfied.152  The 
circuits that have now considered the issue have come to the same general 
conclusion as the Seventh Circuit, agreeing that a company exercising eminent 
domain authority under 717f(h) of the NGA may take possession of the to-be-
condemned land prior to the conclusion of the eminent domain action.153  Those 
 
362, 368–69 (8th Cir. 2014); Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 
2008); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1174 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 1634 (2019). 
 148.   N. Nat. Gas Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388 at *39–40. 
 149.   Id. at *35 n.7.  There is a national split of authority in NGA cases on whether or not to 
require a showing of good faith in negotiations between landowners and natural gas companies prior 
to eminent domain actions.  Compare id. (not requiring good faith as an explicit element), with 
Transwestern Pipeline Co., 550 F.3d at 776 (quoting Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. 138 Acres of 
Land, 84 F. Supp. 2d 405, 416 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (requiring good faith). 
 150.   See N. Nat. Gas Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388 at *40–46. 
 151.   See id. at *39–47.  See also the discussion of the Winters factors, supra Section II.D. 
 152.   N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d 469, 471–72 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 153.   Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725, 737 (3d 
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019); see Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 
915 F.3d 197, 220 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019); Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. 
City of Green, 757 F. App’x 489, 497 (6th Cir. 2018); All. Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 
F.3d 362, 368–69 (8th Cir. 2014); Transwestern Pipeline Co., 550 F.3d at 777–78; see Transcon. Gas 
Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1141, 1174 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1634 
(2019). 
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circuit courts agreed—though they did so under different circumstances—while 
requiring much less for a substantive right.154  Within those later cases in the split 
lies the answer to the question at the heart of this Comment: the lower bar laid out 
first in the Sage case is the right choice for a bar to substantive rights.  With this 
bar set, the timing of just compensation payments can be consistently answered 
with uniformity and ease. 
 
A. Fourth Circuit Start 
Any court that faces eminent domain actions under the NGA must 
determine what sort of bar it wants to put on the substantive right to condemn; the 
Tenth Circuit is one such court.155  If the issue comes before them, the Tenth 
Circuit should adopt the approach suggested by the Fourth Circuit in Sage.  The 
court is better served with the lower bar that was used by Sage and its progeny, 
with extra emphasis placed on the Ninth Circuit.156  The higher bar to substantive 
rights in Northern Border is certainly preferred by landowners wanting payment 
prior to the loss of their land to natural gas companies.157  That being said, the 
lower bar to substantive rights still conforms to statutory requirements, that bar is 
solid and well defined, and it meets the goals of the NGA. 
 
1. The Requirements are Clear and Stable 
The higher bar for substantive rights for immediate possession that is 
discussed by this Comment is born out of an interpretation of the Seventh Circuit’s 
Northern Border case.158  While that case does create a higher standard as 
compared to the lower bar that was later established by the Fourth Circuit in its 
Sage opinion, exact details of the Seventh Circuit’s requirements are hard to 
discern.159  This higher bar for a preexisting substantive right contemplates 
something greater than mere statutory compliance, an interest that comes closer 
to a preexisting ownership interest and right to the property.160  However, what 
the Seventh Circuit demands is something less than an actual ownership interest 
 
 154.   See supra Section II.C. 
 155.   See N. Nat. Gas Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388, at *28–29. 
 156.   See E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 831 (4th Cir. 2004); Transwestern Pipeline 
Co., 550 F.3d at 777–78.  The Ninth Circuit, like Sage, required an order of condemnation.  
Transwestern Pipeline Co., 550 F.3d at 778.  Other courts used summary judgment which might also 
work, but the condemnation order is the preferred method in this Comment.  See Nexus Gas 
Transmission, LLC, 757 F. App’x at 491, 493. 
 157.   N. Nat. Gas Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388, at *19, *21–22. 
 158.   See supra Section II.E.1. 
 159.   See supra Section II.E. 
 160.   N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 1998); see supra 
Section II.E.1. 
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established before the condemnation suit even begins.161  This standard is separate 
from that of the lower bar of Sage, but this higher standard is—at the same time—
less concrete and less stable.162 
 In seeking to settle this issue for the Tenth Circuit, it makes sense to 
choose a standard that is both clear and stable.  The approach adopted by Sage is 
both legally desirable and sufficient, with a relatively clear standard for what is 
required.  This approach is relatively clear, especially when compared to the more 
uncertain requirements of the Northern Border standard.163  Though the circuit 
courts have offered numerous iterations with only small variations, only the 
original variation from Northern Border—the Fourth Circuit’s Sage opinion—has 
been truly significant in the guidance it provided.164  Since the Sage opinion was 
decided, courts across the country have followed the opinion with only slight 
changes or additions to the approach to fit their circumstances.165  As such, the 
Sage standard is not only clear but shows early signs of stability through its 
popularity.166  The repeated use has allowed a fairly uniform outline to form, 
making subsequent application by other courts, such as the Tenth Circuit, much 
easier. 
There has been concern over oppressive stare decisis, especially earlier 
in the history of the United States, a concern regarding a sort of snowballing 
effect.167  There is now a precedent in much of the country for using the lower bar 
to substantive rights.  It is possible that many years from now the Sage line of 
thought will be abandoned in favor of the higher bar or in favor of some alternative 
argument.  However, the process of arriving at this consensus via a number of 
lower court cases as opposed to one single United States Supreme Court case 
means many great legal minds throughout the country have independently argued 
and considered this approach over time.  Thus, the adoption of the lower bar by a 
number of courts that were not bound to follow the opinions of the other courts 
suggests that, in this case, fear of oppressive stare decisis is not well founded.  For 
now, the lower bar approach to substantive rights is relatively stable and that 
approach will likely only become more stable over time.  Finally, the fear of 
 
 161.   N. Border Pipeline Co., 144 F.3d 469; supra Section II.E.1.  
 162.   See supra Sections II.E.1; III.A.1. 
 163.   See N. Border Pipeline Co., 144 F.3d at 472. 
 164.   Compare id., with E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 827, 831 (4th Cir. 2004).  
While Sage and its progeny have vacillated on exactly how to identify a substantive right, they have 
all approached the question in the same way.  Meanwhile, this Comment suggests that the answer 
given by Northern Border is drastically different, suggesting not merely a different answer, but also a 
different approach for getting there. 
 165.   See, e.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 216 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019). 
 166.  It continues to influence cases.  See, e.g., id.; Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 
F.3d 1130, 1166, 1174 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1634 (2019). 
 167.   See supra Section III. 
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oppressive precedent is not—by itself—sufficient deterrence for an otherwise 
useful schema.168 
 
2. Conforms to Statutory Minimum Requirements 
The Constitution requires that “just compensation” be paid at some point 
to those whose land is taken for public benefit.169  It is enough that there is a fairly 
certain and secure provision for the payment, even when there is no payment 
before the condemnation occurs.170  These ideas are not new at this point in this 
Comment, but they demonstrate the meager statutory demands placed on the 
timing of just compensation.171  “The point is straightforward: the Due Process 
Clause provides that certain substantive rights—life, liberty, and property—
cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.”172  
The Loudermill court was concerned about the deprivation of rights without 
proper safeguards built into the procedure.173  The lower bar provided by the Sage 
court utilizes Due Process safeguards such as those considered by the Loudermill 
court174 as well as satisfies each of the requirements and procedures laid out for 
NGA condemnors.175 
The NGA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure discussed above 
provide only little help by providing the basis for these eminent domain actions 
and the edges of the timing requirements.176  While these statutes do not prohibit 
a high bar—as some courts have contended177—the statutes do not exactly require 
a high bar either.  No company is statutorily required to prove it has the pre-
existing substantive right that is associated with the higher bar.178  Statutory 
interpretation does require substantial proof of the right to eminent domain,179 but 
 
 168.   See, e.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 915 F.3d at 216; Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 
6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d at 1152.  
 169.   U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 170.   3 Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 8.10 (2020) (citing Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. 
v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d at 1171 (“Fifth Amendment does not require that compensation be paid before 
taking occurs.  Instead, all that is required is that reasonable, certain and adequate provision for 
obtaining compensation exists at time of taking.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 171.   15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h). 
 172.   Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (differentiating between 
substantive and procedural rights in the context of due process).  
 173.   Id. 
 174.   See id. at 542. 
 175.   15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h). 
 176.   See supra Section II.A. 
 177.   See supra Section III.B. 
 178.   Compare supra Section II.A, with Section II.E.1 (comparing the NGA to the holding in 
Northern Border). 
 179.   See supra Section II.A (requiring a FERC certificate and offer of over $3,000 after 
negotiations failed). 
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no statutes require the application of a high bar as defined in Northern Border.180  
The approach taken in Sage is legally sufficient. 
 
3. This Method Accomplishes the Goal of the NGA. 
The final benefit to the Sage court’s approach is its success at 
accomplishing the goal and purpose of the NGA.  The purpose of the NGA was 
to facilitate the commercial use and sale of natural gas while protecting citizens.181  
The Sage court and the Ninth Circuit used orders of condemnation to determine 
merit for granting a substantive right.182  The Ninth Circuit also ensured money 
was given to the landowners in the waiting period between possession of their 
land and the full end of the condemnation proceedings.183  This method shoots the 
gap between the minimum statutory requirements and the high bar of Northern 
Border, 184  making it a legally efficient compromise and a legally sufficient 
standard for use in the Tenth Circuit. As discussed further below, this debate pulls 
on conflicting threads of law and society.  Despite contentions otherwise, the use 
of an order of condemnation and the providing of immediately available funds 
represent the best choice, while at the same time offering a stable and sufficient 
option for the Tenth Circuit. 
 
B. Seventh Circuit as Counter 
When Landowners are unable to convince courts to abandon immediate 
possession altogether, the “fall back” is to accept and advocate the higher bar as 
advocated in the Seventh Circuit.  Many landowners have looked to the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision to say that in their circumstances, the Seventh Circuit’s 
conclusions apply.185  It would be possible to claim this argument is merely a 
stalling tactic used by the landowners seeking to delay and frustrate natural gas 
companies, as at least one court has considered.186  Better though, is the argument 
that these landowners are following a legally distinct path, forged by the Seventh 
Circuit in its Northern Border case. 
 
 180.   See supra Section II.A. 
 181.   Chartier-Hogancamp, supra note 22, at 74. 
 182.   E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 831 (4th Cir. 2004); Transwestern Pipeline 
Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 183.   Transwestern Pipeline Co., 550 F.3d at 777. 
 184.   See id. at 776–77. 
 185.   See, e.g., Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 215 n.6 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019).  
 186.   See Behnke & Dondis, supra note 24, at 519 (citing Atl. Seaboard Corp. v. Van Sterkenburg, 
318 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1963)).  “The property owner objected to the taking of an easement interest in 
its property and filed a number of dilatory pleadings and motions which the USDC denied.”  Id.  
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The Sage court directly considered the Seventh Circuit’s Northern 
Border opinion and concluded that no split existed because Northern Border had 
varied facts.187  In support of this, the Sage court discussed the two district court 
cases in the Seventh Circuit that “interpreted Northern Border to mean that 
immediate possession is improper only when there has been no order confirming 
the right to condemn.”188  However, the court in Northern Border could easily 
have concluded such an order “merely confirms a condemnor’s general right to 
exercise the normal power of eminent domain in accordance with the powers 
granted to it”189 and that it cannot grant “additional quick-take power upon a 
condemnor.”190 
 
1. Pushback from the Seventh Circuit; Is the Minimum Sufficient? 
The Seventh Circuit opinion pushes back on the assessment that the 
minimum is sufficient.  The Seventh Circuit demands more from the statute.191  A 
whole catalog of sources192 have discussed the incredibly harsh nature of eminent 
domain actions—the forced loss of property is not a thing to be taken lightly—
with one judge going so far as to liken it to the military draft.193   The lack of 
quick-take authority as well as the differences between the NGA and the DTA 
demonstrate a restrained set of powers in the NGA.194  Though Congress drafted 
the all-powerful DTA only a few years prior,195 it chose not to grant those same 
powers to the private companies who were the focus of the NGA. 
The statutes also lend credence to a more searching barrier to a 
substantive right, requiring a close look before an extension of equitable relief in 
NGA cases.  “[B]ecause the power of eminent domain is one of the most harsh 
proceedings known to the law,” these eminent domain statutes “are subject to 
strict construction against the one exercising the power and in favor of the 
landowner.”196  Courts are to restrict powers that grant eminent domain, which 
 
 187.   E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co., 361 F.3d at 827–28.  
 188.   Id.  See N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 64.111 Acres of Land, 125 F. Supp. 2d 299 (N.D. Ill. 
2000); Guardian Pipeline, L.L.C. v. 950.80 Acres of Land, 210 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 189.   Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 101, at 403 n.176. 
 190.   Id. 
 191.   See supra Section II.E.1. 
 192.   As evidence of this point, “[a]ll but two states have adopted constitutional protections 
associated with takings.”  See Chartier-Hogancamp, supra note 22, at 76 (discussing a number of the 
sources that themselves note the harshness of eminent domain action). 
 193.   Id. at 75.  
 194.   See supra Section II.A (outlining the basic differences between the two provisions). 
 195.   Compare 40 U.S.C.S. § 3114(b), with 15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(h). 
 196.   Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 101, at 381 (quoting 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 20 
(2002)).  
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would suggest that they would also be cautious in granting eminent domain 
quickly.197 
The government is worthy of wielding more power than private 
companies.  In cases applying the traditional eminent domain power rather than 
the stronger quick-take powers, “the condemnor cannot seize possession of 
property until it obtains title.  It does not obtain title until it pays the owner the 
amount determined at trial to be just compensation.”198  This case occurred 
outside the purview of the DTA, which meant the federal government was forced 
to wait to seize.199  If the absence of quick-take authority requires the government 
to wait, then perhaps this rule should extend to the private companies under the 
NGA who have significantly less eminent domain authority than the federal 
government.  If the natural gas companies have less authority and power, there is 
little sense in giving them more invasive capabilities. 
 
2. What Makes a Party Worthy of Such a Large Power? 
This limit is not only reflected in the acts themselves but follows from 
the need for just compensation and from the harshness of eminent domain.  For 
these two reasons, it is logical to give the federal government greater power for 
eminent domain.  The federal government has greater resources to make payments 
for its takings and has a much smaller chance of going bankrupt during 
construction of the pipeline as sometimes happens with private companies—
leaving landowners with all or part of a pipeline on their property and uncertainty 
as to what will happen for them next. 
Some will be tempted to argue the federal government needs more 
constraints because it is more powerful200 and so it has more authority that could 
be abused.201  Notwithstanding this argument, abuse of discretion is something 
that should be guarded against, whether the entity threatening the abuse has a large 
or somewhat smaller chance of utilizing such an abuse.  That said, the federal 
government is more beholden to the population than are private companies, 
making abuse of eminent domain authority by the federal government much less 
 
 197.   Id. at 382 (citing City of Richmond v. Carneal, 106 S.E. 403, 406–07 (Va. 1921)).  “If the 
legislature is silent with regard to a certain power, the court should construe the power as being 
withheld because every doubt in construction is to be resolved against the granting of powers of 
eminent domain.”  Id.   
 198.   Id. at 385 n.66 (citing United States v. Certain Lands, 46 F. Supp. 386, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)).   
 199.   Id. at 384–85. 
 200.   In the famous words of Lord Acton, “[p]ower tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely.” Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), in Louise Creighton, 
LIFE AND LETTERS OF MANDELL CREIGHTON, SOMETIME BISHOP OF LONDON, BY HIS WIFE 396 
(1913) https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3224212 [https://perma.cc/QJ9H-RQ6A]. 
 201.   Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 101, at 388. 
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likely to occur and much easier to address in the event that abuses do occur.202  In 
addition to fear of abuse generally, the eminent domain power was granted in the 
Constitution to the federal government203 and—much like the military draft it was 
once compared to204—that mighty power is best wielded by the body for whom it 
was designed.  Eminent domain uses government authority to strip citizens of their 
property rights, rights which are the foundation of American society.  These rights 
should not be taken away lightly. 
The nature of the condemnor themselves is important in determining 
their scope of authority and power.  By contrast to the federal government as 
discussed above, a private company should not be granted the full power of 
eminent domain.  Comparatively, private companies have very limited strength 
and reach, and they lack the durability, financial backing205, and motive206 of the 
federal government.  If an entity is not backed by the national treasury and is 
granted “only those powers that Congress specifically delegates to it”207 then 
necessarily it must not have the same powers as an entity like the federal 
government that does have such authority.  Though this argument is largely 
covered in the discussion of the general differences between the DTA and the 
NGA, drawing this argument out once more aids in demonstrating the 
congressionally recognized limitation on authority for eminent domain.  The use 
of a higher standard for substantive right to take immediate possession of property 
is one such limit. 
The harshness of eminent domain, the varied powers enacted by 
Congress, and the very nature of the two classes of condemnor discussed in this 
Comment present a fair suggestion that perhaps the standard for a substantive 
right prior to immediate possession should be the higher standard from the 
Seventh Circuit’s Northern Border opinion. 
 
 
 202.   While private companies are kept under watch by FERC and other governmental oversight 
agencies generally, they are not subjected to the same amount of direct public access that the 
government is.  This dynamic suggests that the government’s actions are not only more visible to the 
wider public, but those actions are also more easily kept in check. 
 203.   U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 204.   Chartier-Hogancamp, supra note 22, at 75. 
 205.   3 Nichols, supra note 170, at § 8.10 (footnote omitted) (“[w]hen compensation is not paid 
in advance of the taking, there can be no absolute certainty that the owner will get his or her money at 
all.”) (citing Vazza v. Campbell, 520 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1975)).  This fear extends to the availability 
of funds.  A landowner who is not paid right away or guaranteed payment by the federal government 
runs a risk that there will be no money available to them in the future.  Id.  
 206.   See Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 101, at 379 n.42.  Companies may have a harder time 
proving their actions are really motivated by the public good and not “corporate profit and pecuniary 
gain.”  Id. 
 207.   Id. at 380.  
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C. Landowner Arguments Help the Center 
This Comment has discussed two main options for identifying the 
substantive rights necessary to take immediate possession: a high bar set by the 
Northern Border case and a lower bar set by Sage and its progeny.208  Additionally 
the landowners frequently make arguments advocating some version of all-out 
prohibition of condemnation before the end of the condemnation proceedings 
when their time in court initially begins.  While the argument made by the 
landowners is not considered a part of the “split,” their arguments and the court’s 
disposition of these arguments demonstrates the favorability of the Fourth 
Circuit’s approach is functionable. 
 
1. Analyzing and Dissecting the Landowner Arguments 
The Landowners argue that eminent domain authority must be strictly 
construed,209 that quick-takes are impermissible,210 and inadvertently 
demonstrate that a higher bar is not necessary.  A balancing act must occur 
between, first, a strict and literal construction of the statute which might deny 
immediate access because it is not specifically provided for in the NGA and, 
second, a more relaxed interpretation that permits the NGA to function as 
intended.211 
The landowner arguments focus on statutory interpretation and judicial 
authority.  The Sage court, and the others after it, rejected the argument that 
because eminent domain statutes “must be strictly construed, equity [powers] 
cannot be invoked” for the purpose of issuing preliminary injunctions for 
immediate possession.212  The court correctly pointed out that the general eminent 
domain actions themselves were properly within “the strict purpose authorized by 
the NGA” and it also rejected the landowners’ argument because their “circuit has 
never interpreted the strict construction principle” to prohibit equitable relief.213  
This argument also lies on the line between express statutory direction and judicial 
interpretation to promote and facilitate the handling of unclear legal doctrines. 
The same issue arises in the landowner’s second argument that this sort 
of immediate possession action constitutes a quick-take.  This issue highlights the 
 
 208.   See supra Sections II.C, II.E. 
 209.   Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 214 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
140 S. Ct. 300 (2019).  
 210.   N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, No. 10-1232-MLB, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34388, at *21 (D. Kan. March 13, 2012). 
 211.   1A Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain § 3.03 (“Although a statute authorizing the exercise 
of eminent domain power should be construed strictly, it should be enforced in such a way as to 
effectuate the purpose for which it was enacted.”). 
 212.   E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 825–26 (4th Cir. 2004).   
 213.   Id. at 826.  
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difference between the court expediting the process of the NGA and the limited 
language of the statute.  The courts have opted to grant quick-take-like authority, 
but with limits.214  Some have held that the immediate access grant prior to the 
normal conclusion of an eminent domain proceeding does not constitute a quick-
take.215  As discussed before, while the quick-take and straight condemnation are 
very similar, the quick-take is a more expansive and invasive eminent domain 
power.216 
In this way, the congressional restriction placed on the NGA through the 
lack of a provision for quick-take authority delineates courts’ capacities for 
administering the NGA.  Nonetheless, the power to take land prior to the natural 
end of eminent domain proceedings without quick-take authority has routinely 
been granted with seemingly little concern.217  While undoubtedly inconvenient 
for the landowners, the argument does not carry sufficient legal weight.  For these 
circuit courts, granting the right before the trial’s end is a critical step in the 
immediate entry process that is best justified as a concession that helps move the 
eminent domain actions along in the process. 
 
2. Answering One Split with Another 
The landowners’ argument is not traditionally considered a part of the 
“split” in the circuits.  The arguments typically made by the landowners draw as 
much from public policy and NIMBY218 arguments as they draw from legal 
analysis.  The landowners’ argument pulls in some amount of public policy 
consideration—asking what the best interpretation of the statute is where there is 
a lack of direct guidance from Congress and the Constitution.  However, this small 
public policy consideration can develop an answer to the Seventh Circuit’s 
arguments and thus answer the legal question presented in this Comment. 
 
 214.   See supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text (discussing the accusation by landowners 
that the eminent domain actions amount to nothing more than quick-take actions and the court’s 
response that quick-take provisions permit much less landowner involvement).  Modern NGA eminent 
domain actions end up being similar to actions under quick-take authority because few landowners 
have the knowledge, opportunity, or financing to be as involved in the process to the level that is 
intended.  While the true power of the quick-take provisions has been limited to take the form of the 
eminent domain powers as we know them under the NGA, the facts of life blur the lines of those 
distinctions.  E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co., 361 F.3d at 826; Vogt, supra note 7. 
 215.   N. Nat. Gas Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388, at *29–33. 
 216.   E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co., 361 F.3d at 822.  See also supra Section II.F. 
 217.   See, e.g., N. Nat. Gas Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388, at *48–49 (explaining facts 
showed that defendants would receive just compensation). 
 218.   NIMBY is the abbreviation for the term “not in my backyard.”  The term represents the idea 
that, while beneficial to have generally, few people want large public works sites in their  
backyard or right around where they live.  People want the benefit of services but do not want  
to have their area encumbered.  Peter D. Kinder, Not in My Backyard Phenomenon,  
ENCYC. BRITANNICA  (June 14, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Not-in-My-Backyard-
Phenomenon [https://perma.cc/HX99-2EJ4]. 
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The argument of the Landowners who have fought NGA eminent 
domain takings tugs at two important philosophies represented throughout the 
American legal system.  While natural gas has been important to the development 
of the nation, so too are the property rights of landowners.  For one thing, 
consistent and predictable property rights are vital to stability in American 
society.  Citizens may be disincentivized from working hard if there is no 
guarantee that what is earned will be theirs to freely alienate as they so desire. 
Beyond that, property rights were of central importance at the time of the 
founding of the country.  The landowners’ argument is supported by the principles 
of separation of powers.219  The use of equity powers to grant a quick-take like 
authority, the courts can be said to become de facto legislatures in violation of 
separation of powers.220  By taking from property owners their “right to exclude 
others,” a right the Supreme Court has deemed “one of the most essential sticks 
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property,” the courts’ 
actions have eviscerated the notion of separation of powers.221  This stripping of 
property and damage to separation of power are issues that a higher standard for 
substantive rights under the Seventh Circuit would avoid. 
It is worth considering whether the public good may be well served also 
by the fair and predictable payment of landowners for use of their land.  The 
balancing of the two sides nearly always favors the corporations,222 but that 
balancing calculation remains unsettled in the Tenth Circuit.  Countervailing that 
analysis is the benefit to public good provided by the pipelines.  The idea of a 
public good is very important in the typical eminent domain conversation and this 
Comment is no exception.223  In this context, that often leads to a conclusion of 
placing the natural gas companies’ interests ahead of the landowners.  This idea 
dates back to the birth of the NGA.  Implicit in the statute is a recognition of the 
importance of collecting natural gas as a benefit for the public that merited 
regulation to ensure its efficient distribution.224  It has often been suggested in the 
opinions discussed in this Comment that what is in the best interests of the natural 
gas companies is also in the best interests of the public.225  While the role of 
 
 219.   See Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 101, at 373.   
 220.   Id. 
 221.   Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
 222.   See generally Vogt, supra note 7 (discussing the uphill battle that parties face when fighting 
pipeline companies).  
 223.   See Chartier-Hogancamp, supra note 22, at 82.  
 224.   15 U.S.C.S. § 717f(a).  
 225.   See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725, 733 
(3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019); Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 
915 F.3d 197, 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019); Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. 
City of Green, 757 F. App’x 489, 496 (6th Cir. 2018); All. Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 
F.3d 362, 368–69 (8th Cir. 2014); Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 773 (9th 
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natural gas in the United States has long been an important one, there is a way to 
recognize that public benefit while conceding the importance of property rights 
that are infringed with each taking executed under the NGA. 
Ultimately, this tugging between competing ideals can support the final 
conclusion that the Sage court’s substantive right bar is an appropriate one.  The 
lower bar for substantive rights to condemn under the NGA can strike the 
appropriate balance between landowner and corporate desires as well as between 
property rights and public good.  By providing safeguards for landowners such as 
delayed title exchange226 and prepayment or provision of temporary funds until 
final just compensation is provided227 later on, both the statutory requirements228 
and the purpose of the NGA will be fulfilled.229  When such important policies 
are placed in competition, a method that compromises between them is likely the 
best bet. 
 
D. Applying the Law to the Tenth Circuit 
There are very particular facts under which the Tenth Circuit should 
allow companies to take first and pay later.  The Tenth Circuit would first need to 
adopt the analysis of the Sage and District of Kansas cases, as described and 
supported in this Comment.230  If brought before them, the Tenth Circuit must 
review the lower court’s decision on an abuse of discretion basis,231 which will 
make upholding the grant of immediate entry fairly certain. 
The Tenth Circuit would find that Northern Natural Gas Company has 
met the requirements for the substantive right to use eminent domain.232  The 
Company had a proper FERC certificate, it properly attempted to contract with 
the owners of the wells prior to the use of eminent domain, and these wells were 
necessary for the Company’s project.233  The lower court considered these facts 
 
Cir. 2008); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1167 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1634 (2019). 
 226.   E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 825 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 227.   See generally Transwestern Pipeline Co., 550 F.3d at 777 (explaining the benefits of a cash 
deposit as a sort of temporary just compensation).  See also 3 Nichols, supra note 170, at § 8.10. 
 228.   See supra Sections II.A, II.C, II.D (discussing the NGA and Takings Clause statutory 
requirements). 
 229.   See Chartier-Hogancamp, supra note 22, at 74 (stating that the NGA was created in response 
to growing commercial use of natural gas for energy with the intent to keep consumers safe from price 
exploitation). 
 230.   See supra Sections II.E.2, II.G. 
 231.   Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 213 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 300 (2019).  
 232.   See N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388, at *48 
(D. Kan. March 13, 2012). 
 233.   Id. at *58–59.  
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and found them satisfactory.234  There is a split of opinions as to whether the NGA 
requires “good faith” negotiations.235  Much like the present issue, the statute 
provides little help.236  While FERC has specifically mentioned and required 
“good faith” in FERC orders before,237 the District of Kansas case theoretically 
on appeal to the Tenth Circuit in this Comment did not have such a requirement.238  
For the sake of analyzing only one circuit split in this Comment it will be assumed 
that “good faith” has been satisfied or is not required.239 
With substantive right to the property settled, it would be vital to require 
a deposit240 by Northern Natural Gas Company for “the full estimated amount of 
the taking.”241  This amount will be made available to the landowners while the 
exact amount of just compensation is being settled.  This step is vital in striking 
the balance, discussed above, between landowner and property interests on one 
side and corporate and “public benefits” on the other.242 
Finally, the court would need to similarly review the preliminary 
injunction factors to ensure the project warranted immediate possession.  In the 
process of weighing and reviewing those factors, there would be an important 
emphasis placed on the first two factors.  If the Tenth Circuit follows the lead of 
the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit must find that the factor test heavily favors an 
injunction, as some courts consider preliminary injunctions for immediate 
possession to be mandatory injunctions, a particularly harsh form of injunction.243 
 
 234.   Id.  
 235.   See N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1160–61 (D. 
Kan. 2011) (discussing and gathering cases regarding the split). 
 236.   Id. at 1161. 
 237.   Id.  
 238.   N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388, at *35–38 
n.7.  There is a split of authority in NGA cases on whether or not to require a showing of good faith 
in negotiations between landowners and natural gas companies prior to eminent domain actions.  
Compare id. (not requiring good faith as an explicit element), with Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 
Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. 138 Acres of Land, 
84 F. Supp. 2d 405, 416 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations omitted)) (requiring good faith). 
 239.   See N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, 781 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (suggested 
that there was no need for good faith because of the statutory language).  “The plain language of the 
NGA does not impose an obligation on a holder of a FERC certificate to negotiate in good faith before 
acquiring land by exercise of eminent domain.”  Id. (quoting Kansas Pipeline Co. v. 200 Foot by 250 
Foot Piece of Land, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1257 (D. Kan. 2002)).  
 240.   It is worth noting here that parties and courts often disagree as to whether deposits or bonds 
are better protections for landowners.  See, e.g., N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388, at *20–22 (D. Kan. March 13, 2012).  
 241.   Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d at 777.  
 242.   See supra Section III.C. 
 243.   Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d at 776 (citing Stanley v. Univ. of S. 
Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994)).  See also the discussion of preliminary injunctions supra 
Section II.D. 
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If the court opted to use factors like those in the District of Kansas case244 
or those from the Supreme Court’s Winter case as followed by the Fourth 
Circuit,245 the Tenth Circuit would first find that the Company was likely to 
succeed on the merits of its case.  A condemnation order may fall short of the 
summary judgment that had already been awarded in the Fourth Circuit’s 
Mountain Valley Pipeline case,246 but it nonetheless demonstrates a substantial 
likelihood of success and has been sufficient in other courts.247 
Second, if the injunction is not granted, there would be irreparable harm 
to the Company.  The company here is attempting eminent domain over a number 
of wells that, with respect to at least one of the wells, will not only hurt the 
company’s future growth, but will also cause current problems of gas migration 
if the company cannot take it over and implement its fortification plan.248  The 
Company here has a stronger argument for irreparable harm than many of the 
companies considered previously in this Comment, whose sole issue was future 
lost profits.249  Not only must the Company deal with lost future profits, but also 
faces concern over long-term viability of its operation and concern over its 
reputation should it fail to maintain service to its customers. 
Third, the losses to the Company outstrip the losses the well owners 
would face.  As the lower court found that the “potential harms to [non-movants], 
which appear compensable, are substantially outweighed by the danger of 
irreparable harm to Northern from being unable to restore the integrity of the 
storage field.”250  Finally, this injunction would be in the interest of the public.  
FERC has previously decided this issue and while this is not dispositive with 
regard to a public interest finding for a preliminary injunction, FERC’s finding 
does suggest a benefit.251  Furthermore, this eminent domain action helps the 
company to not only expand its capacity, but also to maintain its current ability.  
This is an important consideration especially for the many landowners who could 
 
 244.   N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388, at *39–
47. 
 245.   Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 211 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 300 (2019). 
 246.   Id. at 210–11.  
 247.   See, e.g., Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d at 777; E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. 
v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 827 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 248.   N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388, at *40–
41. 
 249.   See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres, 907 F.3d 725, 
729, 733 (3d Cir. 2018) cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019); Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City 
of Green, 757 F. App’x 489, 491 (6th Cir. 2018); All. Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, 746 F.3d 
362, 364 (8th Cir. 2014); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1141–42 (11th 
Cir. 2018) cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1634 (2019); Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 
770, 772 (9th Cir. 2008).   
 250.   N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34388, at *46.  
 251.   See id. at *47.  
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lose partial service should the Company need to wait to solve the problem.  
Continued service without interruption is plainly within the best interest of the 
consuming public. 
Applying the Sage Court’s approach and the Winter factors, the Tenth 
Circuit should find that the District of Kansas case properly sorted the issues and 
awarded entry to property before payment of just compensation is made. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Seventh Circuit’s Northern Border decision required much more of 
condemnors.  Under equal circumstances, the six circuits that have considered the 
issue since that decision would have been tighter fisted on declaring sufficient 
substantive rights.  The two approaches discussed in this Comment were not mere 
fact differences, but legally significant separations.  The Tenth Circuit—the 
circuit with the second most miles of natural gas pipeline in the nation252—should 
resolve the issue for itself by following the ‘lower bar’ approach as articulated in 
E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage.253  While landowners will likely not favor this 
approach compared to a total bar on eminent domain, it provides a balanced, 
consistent, and legally sufficient standard for all courts in the Tenth Circuit to use 
and apply.  Finally, in the future—and depending in part on the strength of 
landowner support—two long-term solutions could come to pass.  First, while the 
Supreme Court has not heard cases on this issue yet, it has had the chance to do 
so and to provide a nationwide answer to this split.254  Alternatively, Congress 
could amend the NGA to specify what is required.  For the time being, disputes 
will still arise, and people will argue their case, but this approach is the best bet 
under the circumstances at a time of continued growth. 
 
 
 252.   See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 13 (finding that Texas alone has more than 
double the pipeline as the next highest state, and that Oklahoma and Kansas rank in the top four).  
 253.   E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 831 (4th Cir. 2004). See supra Section II.E.2. 
 254.   As the Supreme Court denied three chances to hear this issue this term, this solution may 
not come about anytime soon.  See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 
Acres, 907 F.3d 725, 741 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied 139 S. Ct. 2639 (2019); Mountain Valley 
Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres, 915 F.3d 197, 223 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019); 
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130, 1174 (11th Cir. 2018) cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 1634 (2019). 
